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Abstract This paper investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a socially
concerned unionised monopoly producing a network good. We show that the
recently established result that under network effects the firm prefers sequential
efficient bargaining may be reversed when there are social concerns. Thus, firm’s
social responsibility restores also in network industries the conventional result of the
trade-union economics that the firm prefers right-to-manage (RTM). However, this
may result rather paradoxical because RTM is always welfare-inferior and thus the
higher the social responsibility is, the lower the social welfare outcome due to the
agenda selection. As a consequence an increase of the firms’ social concerns in
network industries may reduce, through the channel of the unionised labour market,
social welfare, in contrast with the common sense. This sheds some light on so far
unexplored effects of the promotion of social responsibility activities by policy
makers when also labour markets are taken into account.
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1 Introduction
Two stylised facts have involved firms’ behaviours in recent decades. On the one
hand, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has generated a large amount of interest
in the economics and management literature (see, e.g., the survey article of Carroll
and Shabana 2010).1 On the other hand, network industries are among the fastest
developing sectors of advanced modern economics.
With regard to the firms’ CSR behaviours, numerous reports have witnessed an
increasing trend of this phenomenon: for instance, the KPMG Survey of Corporate
responsibility (Cr) in 2013 observes that ‘‘this year the research is more broad-
ranging than ever, covering 4100 companies across 41 countries (the last survey in
2011 looked at 3400 companies in 34 countries)…the growth in the number of
countries and companies covered in this survey is just one indication of how Cr
reporting has evolved into a mainstream business practice over the last two
decades.’’ (KPMG 2013, 3). In particular, as regards countries showing this trend
‘‘..large companies in Italy, Spain and the UK lead the world for the quality of Cr
reports. European G250 companies achieve the highest average quality score for
their Cr reports at 68 out of 100. This compares with average scores of 51 for
companies in the Americas and 48 in Asia Pacific.’’ (KPMG 2013, 17). The
economy of social and environmental sustainability plays a crucial role in the
European Union, as is clearly shown by the fact that more than 10% of the total
European Economy (in terms of GDP), with more than 11 millions of workers (6%
of total employment) belongs to this sector.
With regard to the relevance of network goods in modern economies, one may
think the large-scale expansions of, for example, telephones, mobile devices and
software: it is natural to observe that the utility of a particular consumer from using
those goods increases with the number of other users.2 Moreover, it is important to
note that most giant firms in network industries are distinctly oriented towards CSR
behaviours, so that the production of network goods and the exercise of CSR
behaviours goes hand in hand. In fact, according to the Reputation Institute Global
CSR survey, among the world’s top ten companies with the best CSR reputations,
large multinationals active in network industries are prevailing, as Table 1 shows,
which reports the top 10 companies of the past 3 years of the Global CSR RepTrak
(Reputation Institute 2015).
1 One definition of CSR is as follows: ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on voluntary basis’
(European Commission 2001).
2 In general, network goods are products in which the utility one consumer/user derives increases with
the number of other consumers/users of that goods. Put differently, the total sales of the goods enhance
the welfare of each consumer. In addition, the number of other consumers/users of the product may
directly influence the demand for the network goods because it may represent the product quality and
availability of after-sale services for long-lasting consumers. More in general positive network externality
may exist for those products which a consumer wishes to possess in part because others do (i.e. the so-
called Bandwagon Effect), for instance products of fashion industry.
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Moreover, a growing literature in industrial organisation has recently recognized
the crucial role played by unions in oligopolies (see, for example, Dowrick
1989, 1990; Horn and Wolinsky 1988; Lo´pez and Naylor 2004). Given the
importance of network industries in contemporary economy, it is timely to
investigate what is the impact of unionisation in those sectors. Several large
companies in those industries (e.g., Silicon Valley giants such as Microsoft, Google,
Yahoo and Apple) are mainly not unionised. However, workers have recently been
able to form unions in those companies. For instance, in early March 2015, due to
recently passed legislation in California, Apple bowed to pressure from the labour
union SEIU-USWW and agreed to directly employ security guards on its Cupertino,
California, campus instead of hiring the work out through a subcontractor. Then,
Facebook shuttle drivers gained final approval for their union contract (Al Jazeera
America 2015). In September 2015, 38 bug tester who work full time
in Microsoft’s offices to review apps voted to create a union, the Temporary
Workers of America (BloombergBusinessweek 2015). Therefore, if the workforce
in large CSR companies in network industries is to become unionised, it is rather
natural to investigate the impact of bargaining for those companies and the overall
welfare.
A classical result in the unionised firm literature is that profits are higher when
firms bargain only over wage and choose employment (right-to-manage, RTM) with
respect to the ones when they also bargain over employment (simultaneous, EB, or
sequential efficient bargaining, SEB) (Naylor 2003).3 Indeed, a central issue of
labour market institutions in advanced economies is the selection of the bargaining
Table 1 Global CSR RepTrak: top 10 past 3 years
2015 2014 2013
1 Google Google Microsoft
2 BMW Microsoft The Walt Disney Company
3 The Walt Disney Company The Walt Disney Company Google
4 Microsoft BMW BMW
5 Daimler Apple Daimler
6 Lego Lego Sony
7 Apple Volkswagen Intel
8 Intel Intel Volkswagen
9 Rolls-Royce Rolex Apple
10 Rolex Daimler Nestle’
Bold indicates the companies operating in network industries
3 Dowrick (1990) has first analysed the subject of the more profitable bargaining agenda in the context of
unionised industries. That author has found ‘‘that profits under the RTM model exceed those under
Efficient Bargaining’’ (Naylor 2003, pag. 59). Moreover, from the comparison of the RTM and SEB
bargaining outcomes, the conventional result argues that ‘‘under unionised monopoly, the firm will prefer
to keep employment off the bargaining agenda whatever the degree of union influence over employment.
In other words, the right-to-manage outcome generates higher profits than either the efficient or sequential
bargains, for a given level of union influence over the wage’’ (Naylor 2003, pag. 61).
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agenda between firms and unions, and the rise of possible conflicts of/common
interest among the bargaining parties. Other established results of the unionised firm
literature are that unions (and consumers) always prefer the EB agenda and thus a
(possibly undesirable) conflict of interest between the bargaining parties (and
agents) always occurs (Bughin 1999; Buccella 2011).
A few papers have recently revisited the selection of the bargaining agenda (Fanti
2015; Buccella and Fanti 2015; Fanti and Buccella 2015, 2016). In particular, Fanti
and Buccella (2016) analyse the choice of the bargaining agenda in a unionised
monopoly with network effects. Those authors show that, in contrast to the
established result that in pure monopoly the firm always chooses RTM, a SEB
agreement is preferred, provided that the intensity of the network is sufficiently
strong. Such a result means that in network goods industries the firm’s choice of the
SEB arrangement allows to eliminate the conflict of interests between different
agents and achieve a Pareto-superior outcome. However, none of the previous
contributions considers the presence of CSR firms.
Despite the relevance of both positive consumption externalities and CSR, issues
pertaining to network goods industries with CSR rules, to the best of our knowledge,
are scanty in the literature on unionised industries. In this paper we aim to fill this
gap. An objective of the paper is to investigate whether firms’ engagement in CSR
activities is always desirable from a social welfare point of view when labour
market institutions are considered. Scholars4 as well as policy-makers5 claim that
CSR activities have positive effects on social welfare. Moreover it has been also
argued that a direct social-welfare-enhancing effect may stem from the emergence
of the CSR phenomenon through its role in mitigating market failures as substitutive
of a socially costly market regulation,6 as noted by Valach (2015, 1705): ‘‘From a
welfare point of view, promoting corporate social responsibility can be an
alternative or complementary way for regulation to confront market failures.
Regulation is costly; it has limitations originating from asymmetric information and
political constraints. It also has a limited impact over global public goods (global
warming, Amazon deforestation, biodiversity loss, or child labour). Corporate social
responsibility can reach where national regulations fall short and have a great
impact on our wellbeing.’’
Given the relevant presence of CSR firms in Europe, European policy makers are
actively working for a further promotion of firms’ social concerns.7 Since the
4 For instance, Frank (2003) argues that social concerns increase social welfare by enhancing the
‘‘common good.’’.
5 For instance its promotion is clearly affirmed by policy-makers in Europe (European Commission
2006, 2011).
6 The idea that CSR can prevent market failures such as firms’ power market and environmental
externality, and thus constitute an alternative instrument with respect to the traditional one of markets
regulation generally used to prevent such failures has been developed by Calveras et al. (2007) and
Ganuza (2012).
7 For instance, ‘‘on October 2011 the European Commission has adopted a Social Business Initiative
action plan as part of a package of measures entitled the ‘‘Responsible Business Initiative’’ (see IP/11/
1238) which will help this emerging sector to fulfill its potential. This initiative is complemented by an
ambitious strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility to generate a higher level of trust and consumer
confidence and improve companies’ contribution to societal well-being. The aim of the Social Business
Econ Polit
123
promotion of CSR is high on the policy agenda for sustainable development in many
countries, then it is of interest—especially for European countries which have a
sizable presence of both CSR firms and unionised firms—to investigate so far
unexplored effects of CSR rules such as those on the choice of the bargaining
agenda.
More in detail, we want to answer the following research questions: first, how
does firms’ social concern change the above mentioned result under network
effects? Second, how are the agents’ and societal welfares affected by the
modification of the agenda’s choice induced by firms’ social concerns?
Indeed, the main result is that, rather surprisingly, the adoption of CSR rules by
firms restores the classical bargaining agenda result. Thus, since the RTM agenda is
welfare-reducing, we show that, through this channel, the expected welfare-
enhancement effects occur because of the CSR activities’ promotion is challenged.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
monopoly-union bargaining model and then presents and discusses the results.
Finally, the last section summarises the main results and their welfare implications
and suggests directions for further research on the subject.
2 The model
The monopolist’s profit function is:
p ¼ ðp c wÞq; ð1Þ
where p is the price of good, w is the wage per unit of output and c is the marginal
cost (for inputs different from the labour).
As Katz and Shapiro (1985) assume, the simple mechanism describing here the
network effects is that the surplus a firm’s client gets directly increases with the
number of other clients of this firm. We strictly follow Fanti and Buccella (2016)8
by assuming that the monopolist faces the following linear direct demand:
q ¼ a pþ ny; ð2Þ
where q denotes the quantity of the goods produced, y denotes the consumers’
expectation about monopolist’s equilibrium production,9 the parameter n 2 ½0; 1Þ
Footnote 7 continued
Initiative is to support those social businesses whose mission is to generate significant social, environ-
mental and community impacts for a more sustainable economic growth. When launching the initiative
the EU remarked that one out of four new firms in Europe are ‘‘social business’’.‘‘ (Becchetti et al. 2014,
4).
8 The interested reader is referred to that work for further details.
9 Note that we strictly follow here the assumptions of Katz and Shapiro (1985). However, as also Katz
and Shapiro (1985, Appendix A) and Amir and Lazzati (2011) notice, in some contexts firms may be able
to commit strongly to a product level before consumers decide their purchases (only the equilibrium
production levels are credible announcements). In such cases the effect of the monopolist production
decisions without consumers’ expectations may lead to different equilibrium outcomes. This extension is
left for future research.
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indicates the strength of network effects (i.e., the higher the value of the parameter
is, the stronger the network effects are). The inverse demand function is:
p ¼ a qþ ny: ð3Þ
We also assume that the firm has social concerns, i.e. the shareholder value is
combined with stakeholders’ interests. This combination leads to a broader firm
objective function which is modelled following previous analytical frameworks
(e.g. Goering 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014; Kopel and Brand 2012; Lambertini and
Tampieri 2010, 2011). More precisely, we assume that, additionally to its profit, p,
the firm takes also care of the consumer surplus, CS. Hence, the firm’s objective
function, W, can be rewritten as




where r 2 ½0; 1 indicates the weight put on consumer surplus (‘‘the social con-
cern’’). For r ¼ 0, the monopolist operates like a profit maximising while, for r ¼ 1,
the whole consumer surplus is considered in the firm’s objective function.10
2.1 The union behaviour
The efficient bargaining may be either simultaneous over wage and employment
(EB) (McDonald and Solow 1981) or sequential, first over wage and then over
employment (SEB) (Manning 1987a, b). Under EB, the monopolist-union unit
simultaneously bargains over wages w and quantity q to maximise the Nash product.
On the other hand, under RTM, the monopolist-union unit first bargains over wages
w to maximise the Nash product; however, in the subsequent stage, the firm has the
right to select output and, therefore, employment.
Moreover, following Katz and Shapiro (1985) and the recent literature on
network goods (Hoernig 2012; Chirco and Scrimitore 2013; Bhattacharjee and Pal
2014), we impose the additional ‘‘rational expectations’’ conditions, that is
consumers fulfil their expectations at equilibrium (i.e. y ¼ q). As usual, our
equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and we solve this
game by the backward induction method.
In the present paper, we compare the SEB with the RTM model. The rationale for this
choice resides in the fact that with those two models, consumers fulfil their expectations
about the network size exactly at the same stage of the game, as shown in Fig. 1.
In the RTM and SEB cases, monopolist’s decisions are taken in two different stages.
In the first stage, the monopolist-union unit bargains over wages w to maximise the
Nash product. In the second stage, consumers fulfil their expectations. Finally, in the
10 Thus, the stakeholders’ participation in governance is only relevant to market decisions. In other
words, stakeholders exerts ‘‘pressure’’ with regard to the firm’s objective; however, private owners make
the company’s strategic decisions. This assumption is consistent with the empirical findings of Spitzeck
and Hansen (2010) that the stakeholders engagement mechanism is mainly limited to ‘‘dialogue & issues’’
advisory while the strategic decisions of the company (like the choice of the bargaining agenda in the
union-firm negotiations) are beyond their sphere.
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third stage (1) with RTM, the monopolist selects the quantity q (alternatively, the price
p) to maximise profits, (2) with SEB, the monopolist-union unit negotiates over the
quantity q (alternatively, the price p) to maximise the Nash product.
The union utility function is V ¼ ðw wÞl (e.g. Pencavel 1985), where l is
employment and w the reservation wage. Given the standard assumption of
constant returns to labour, q = l, it follows that
V ¼ ðw wÞq: ð5Þ
The following generalized Nash Product models the bargaining solution in the
case of CSR firm
N ¼ W1bVb; ð6Þ
where b 2 ½0; 1 represents the bargaining power of the union. Using Eqs. (1)–(5)
and solving the Nash Product in Eq. (6), direct computations allow to derive the
expressions in Table 2. The Appendix reports the extensive derivations. Based on
the equilibrium outcomes for the alternative bargaining agendas in Table 2, we
analyse the impact of the firm’s engagement in CSR activities in a monopoly with
network goods.
2.2 Main results and their discussion
Let us now carry out the analysis of CSR activities in network industries.
Assumption 1 To assure the non-negativity of all the variables of the model, the
following inequalities hold throughout the paper:
1Þ a cþ w; 2Þ rT;NET  2ð1  bÞ
2  ð1 þ nÞb
where the upper script NET stands for ‘‘network’’. Note that the presence of
network externalities increases the critical value of the monopolist level of CSR
activities rT;NET .





























































































































































































































































































































































































































An analytical inspection shows that oq
RTM;NET
on [ 0 and
oqSEB;NET
on [ 0: the network
intensity boosts the monopolist to raise production. Therefore, the network effects
complement the CSR engagement in stimulating output expansion, and further put
downward pressure on the final price, regardless of the bargaining agenda. The
impact of the network effects on output expansion (price reduction) under the SEB

















reveals that, for b 2 ½0; 1, o2qRTM;NETonor ¼ o
2qRTM;NET





under both agendas, the CSR engagement and the network effects reinforce each
other in expanding output. In other words, those effects are complement on the
output decision.
Let us now analyse the impact of CSR and network effects on profits.
Differentiation shows that op
RTM;NET








1r : under the
RTM agenda, the network effects always have a positive impact on profits;
however, the level of social engagement has a positive effect on the firm’s
profitability only if its level is lower than the network intensity, as the threshold
r
RTM;NET
1r indicates (the first index denotes the first partial derivative, the second













2 (the first index of the thresh-





1r for n 2 ½0; 1, whenever the level of social engagement has a
positive impact on profits, the network effect has a complementarity effect on
profitability.
As regards the SEB agenda, differentiation of the profit function with respect to























1r : under the SEB agenda, it exists an optimal value of both the
network effects and CSR level, depending on the union bargaining power, that
















Because for n 2 ½0; 1 _ b 2 ½0; 1 it holds that rSEB;NET2 \rSEB;NET1n , it follows that
the level of social engagement has a complementarity effect on profits only up to a
level of the network externalities lower than their optimal value.




1r for n 2 ½0; 1 _ b 2 ½0; 1, when
the level of CSR has a positive impact on profits, the network effect always has a
complementarity effect on profitability: in that case, the two forces work in the same
direction to increase the monopolist’s profits.
Now, we investigate if the network effects have an impact on the monopolist’s
bargaining agenda choice. Let us define DpNET ¼ pSEB;NET  pRTM;NET and




¼ bð2  bÞ
2ða c wÞ2½ð1 þ nÞr  2fr2½bð1 þ nÞ  2 þ r½4  bð3 þ nÞ þ 2ðn2 þ bÞ  4ng
4f2ð2  b nÞ þ r½ð1 þ nÞb 2g2ð2  n rÞ2 ;
ð7Þ
and it can be shown that DVNET [ 0 in the relevant parameter space. An analytical
and graphical inspection reveals the following result.
Result 1 When the firm’s sensitivity to consumer surplus rises, the SEB agenda
requires an increasing level of the network intensity to be preferred to RTM.
However, given that SEB is always the union’s preferred agenda, there is room to
negotiate an agreement in common interest.
Corollary The presence of a strong union: (a) requires that the network effects
have to be adequately intense to allow the bargaining parties to reach a common
interest agreement toward the SEB agenda, i.e. the higher b is, the less likely
DpNET [ 0 is for a given n (from direct inspection of the three areas depicted in
Fig. 2); (b) reduces firm’s CSR activities compatible with profitability (see the three
vertical axes in Fig. 2).
A graphical representation of Result 1 is depicted in Fig. 2. With respect to the
basic case of a monopolist in a network industry without CSR described in Fanti and
Buccella (2016), the presence of CSR activities shrinks the area of profitability of
the monopolist in the network industry. Nonetheless, the intuition behind the finding
of Result 1 reflects that of those authors. It is obtained that qRTM\qSEB and
pRTM[ pSEB in the ðn; rÞ space, the costs of production are identical regardless of
the agenda, and independent of both the network intensity and the level of social
engagement: in fact, wRTM ¼ wSEB independent of r and n, while c is exogenous.
Given these results, the fact that DpNET \[ 0 apparently seems puzzling. A closer
analytical investigation reveals that, in equilibrium, for a given level of the union
bargaining power, the monopolist produces at a point on the demand curve in which
the price elasticity of demand under RTM is always larger than SEB, that is,
Fig. 2 Plot of the ‘‘threshold curves’’ DpNET ¼ 0 and pNET ¼ 0 (i.e. rT;NET  2ð1bÞ
2ð1þnÞb) in the ðn; rÞ
space, for three given levels of b ¼ :1; :5; :9. The curves are drawn for a ¼ 1, c ¼ wo ¼ 0. For all ðn; rÞ
combinations below the dash curves pNET ¼ 0, pNET [ 0
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eRTM;NETðn; rÞ[ eSEB;NETðn; rÞ. Because the production costs are unaffected by
CSR activities and network effects, the analysis of the profits differential mirrors
that of the revenues differential.
Defining the marginal revenues differential of the two agendas as
DMRNET ¼ ðMRSEB;NET MRRTM;NETÞ, algebraic passages leads to














The first term of the above expression is unambiguously negative. On the other
hand, the sign of the second term depends on the precise values of the parameters
ðn; rÞ, because 1eRTM;NET ðn;rÞ\ 1eSEB;NET ðn;rÞ. In Fig. 2, the area in which DpNET [ ð\Þ0
defines the combination of the parameters in the ðn; rÞ space such that the price
differential effect between the two agendas is dominated by (dominates) the
quantity variation effect on the monopolist’s revenues.
The profit change is reversed (i.e., RTM is better) as CSR increases or network
effect decreases. Therefore, it seems that these two effects are substitutable in profit
change. A plausible explanation for this result is as follows. On one hand, the
network effect will encourage the firms both to expand output and to charge higher
price, which in turn will provide higher wage; on the other hand, CSR will also
bolster output production and, therefore, induce the firms to reduce the final price,
which will provide lower wage in negotiations. Therefore, when the network
externalities are higher or the level of CSR activities is lower, both the firm and the
union can enjoy higher welfare under SEB rather than RTM.11 On the other hand,
by directly increasing the costs of production, the role of the parameter b is to
reduce the area of the monopolist’s profitability, which is associated to a decreasing
level of social engagement when the network effects are not sufficiently intense.12
2.3 Special cases: a short discussion
This subsection briefly discusses the following special cases: (1) n ¼ 0 and r ¼ 0;
(2) n[ 0 and r ¼ 0; (3) n ¼ 0 and r[ 0. The interested reader can find a detailed
discussion of those special cases in the supplement and Fanti and Buccella (2016).
2.3.1 Standard model: n ¼ 0 and r ¼ 0
This is the standard model in the presence of goods without consumption
externalities and no CSR activities the early literature has analysed. In unionized
industries, the monopolist always gains larger profits with RTM rather than SEB and
EB (Dowrick 1990), and profits under efficient bargaining are identical, irrespective
of whether the timing of the negotiations is sequential or simultaneous (Naylor
11 We are extremely grateful to an anonymous referee for having underlined this point.
12 See in Fig. 2 when b ¼ :9, if n is high and tends to unity, the CSR level can be adequately high.
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2003). This generates a conflict of interest between the firm and the union, because
the latter prefers SEB to RTM. In addition, consumers and society always prefer
SEB to RTM because qRTM\qSEB. However, if the monopolist has the right to select
the agenda, it will choose RTM leading to a welfare-inferior outcome.
2.3.2 No CSR activities in network industry: n[ 0 and r ¼ 0
Fanti and Buccella (2016, pp. 96–99) have carried out an in depth analysis of this
case. Those authors find that in a network industry without CSR rules, (1) a
monopolist prefers SEB to RTM provided that the network effects are adequately
intense, and the lower the union’s bargaining power, the more likely the monopolist
prefers SEB; and (2) the union always prefers SEB to RTM. Therefore, when the
network effects are sufficiently strong, the monopolist and the union can agree on
the SEB agenda. In addition, the wages under RTM and SEB are identical and
independent of n. These results contrast the conventional wisdom of the standard
model without consumption externalities and CSR activities above in which the
monopolist always gains larger profits with RTM rather than SEB (Dowrick 1990),
and profits under efficient bargaining are identical, regardless of whether the timing
is sequential or simultaneous (Naylor 2003). Finally, the authors show that
consumers and society are better off under SEB than RTM and, thus, when the
network effect is adequately high, the SEB arrangement is Pareto-superior: the
monopolist, workers and consumers prefer it.
2.3.3 CSR in standard industries without network effects: n ¼ 0 and r[ 0
In the absence of network effects, the key finding is that the monopolist prefers
RTM to SEB, no matter the level of social engagement. However, this choice
creates a conflict of interest with the union. Therefore, the adoption of CSR
behaviours substantiates the conventional wisdom (see Naylor 2003) that a
unionised monopolist prefers to negotiate only wages and keep off employment
from negotiations. It can be easily checked that qRTM\qSEB and pRTM [ pSEB, while
the production costs are identical and independent of the social concern level
regardless of the agenda: in fact, wRTM ¼ wSEB with r playing no role and c
exogenous. Finally, an analytical investigation reveals that both the consumer
surplus and the social welfare are higher under the SEB agenda than the RTM, as
expected. As a consequence, in the absence of network externalities, the monopolist
adopting CSR rules and negotiating under the RTM agenda with the union always
leads to a welfare-reducing effect larger than that of the SEB agenda.
2.4 Welfare considerations
At this point, it is of extreme interest to analyse the impact of CSR and network
effects on consumer surplus and social welfare. The analysis focuses on the
consumer surplus because it has a simpler expressions than social welfare and, given
that those variables move exactly in the same direction, this choice does not affect
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the qualitative results. Defining, DCSNET ¼ CSSEB;NET  CSRTM;NET and
DSWNET ¼ SWSEB;NET  SWRTM;NET , an analytical investigation reveals, as
expected, that, DCSNET [ 0, DSWNET [ 0.13
Differentiation shows that oCS
RTM;NET






or [ 0: under
the RTM agenda, the network effects have a positive effect on the consumer surplus
(and social welfare) only if its level is lower than the social engagement, as the
threshold r
RTM;NET
1n illustrates; however, the CSR activities always have a positive











1n for n 2 ½0; 1, it follows that the network effects have a
complementarity effect on consumer surplus only up to a level of the CSR activities
lower than the most beneficial value for consumers.
Concerning the SEB agenda, differentiation of consumer surplus expression with












or [ 0: under the SEB agenda, it exists a value of the network effects that


















1n , the network externalities have a complementarity
effect on consumer surplus (and social welfare) only for a level of the social
engagement lower than that most beneficial for consumers.
Now, let us investigate the consequences of the monopolist’s choice of the
bargaining agenda. Because of the change in the firm’s preference over the
negotiation mode, the following result applies.
Result 2 Whenever the monopolist decides to adopt the RTM agenda in
negotiations with the union, a social welfare-reducing effect takes place.
Given that for a given level of the network effects a relatively high firm’s social
concern induces the adoption of the RTM agenda, then CSR may imply, in contrast
to the common belief, a reduction (instead of an increase) of both consumer surplus
and social welfare as a whole.
A simple illustrative example (using the parametric set of Fig. 2, a ¼ 1,
c ¼ wo ¼ 0) may clarify this crucial point. For the level of network effects n ¼ :5,
when the level of CSR engagement is not so high (that is, on the left of the threshold
DpNET ¼ 0), the monopolist prefers the SEB agenda. However, if the CSR level is
adequately high, (beyond DpNET ¼ 0), the firm switches its preference from the SEB
to the RTM agenda, which leads to a drop both in the level of the consumer surplus
and social welfare (the two variables move in unison), as Fig. 3 shows. Nonetheless,
if the level of social engagement under the RTM agenda becomes sufficiently
high, CSRTM;NET rDpNET¼0

 CSSEB;NET r\DpNET¼0j and SWRTM;NET rDpNET¼0

 
SWSEB;NET r\DpNET¼0j . For b ¼ :5; n ¼ :5, the switch of the agenda from SEB to
RTM takes place at r ¼ :259 (the level of the CSR such that DpNET ¼ 0, while
13 Additional analytical and graphical details are available upon request from the authors.
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rT ¼ :8). It follows that CSSEB;NET r¼:259j ¼ :20 while CSRTM;NET r¼:259j ¼ :09 and
SWSEB;NET r¼:259j ¼ :695 while SWRTM;NET r¼:259j ¼ :513: the increase of the monop-
olist profits is more than offset by the reduction of the consumer surplus (the largest
part of the social welfare drop) and union utility. Nonetheless, it can be checked that
it exists a value of the social engagement such that the consumer surplus and the
social welfare under the two agendas reaches the same level: for instance, at
r ¼ :66, CSRTM;NET r¼:66j ¼ :20 and SWRTM;NET r¼:66j ¼ :695.
On the other hand, when the union bargaining power is high enough, it may be
that the change of the agenda is unequivocally welfare detrimental. In fact, for
b ¼ :7; n ¼ :5, the monopolist changes the agenda from SEB to RTM at r ¼ :067.
It follows that CSSEB;NET r¼:067j ¼ :18 while CSRTM;NET r¼:067j ¼ :05 and, as regards
social welfare, SWSEB;NET r¼:067j ¼ :40 while SWRTM;NET r¼:067j ¼ :667. However, it
Fig. 3 Plot of the consumer surplus (up) and social welfare (down) as function of the CSR level, for two
levels of the union bargaining power b ¼ :5; :7, and for a level of the network effect n ¼ :5. The other
parameters are set at a ¼ 1, c ¼ wo ¼ 0
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can be easily seen from Fig. 3, that in the feasibility area of the economy (r rT) it
always holds that CSRTM;NET\CSSEB;NET and SWRTM;NET\SWSEB;NET . The union
bargaining power sharpens the fall in the consumer surplus and social welfare due to
the change in the negotiation agenda. As a consequence, to equate the levels of
those variables under SEB, the RTM agenda requires a level of CSR sufficiently
high. However, when the union is adequately strong, whichever level of CSR
compatible with the monopolist’s profitability under RTM cannot suffice to attain
the consumer surplus and social welfare levels under SEB.
3 Conclusions
This paper, motivated by the presence of unionised labour markets as well as the
recent diffusion of both firm’s social concerns and network goods (especially in
Europe), investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a socially concerned
unionised monopoly producing network goods. A cornerstone of the trade union
economics argues that the most profitable negotiation agenda is the RTM one.
However, recently Fanti and Buccella (2016) have shown that the network effects
may reverse the established results of the previous literature: in fact, (1) a
monopolist does not always prefer RTM, a SEB agreement can be preferred, (2)
because the union and consumers always prefers the SEB agenda, the presence of
network effects may solve the traditional conflict of interests between parties and
achieve a Pareto-superior societal outcome.
Another feature characterising the current behaviour of many firms, in particular
of those producing network goods, is their increasing interest for social themes,
especially also accounting for the interests of their stakeholders such as consumer
clients. In fact, it is crucial for a company building reputation and gaining trust from
people to become successful: stakeholders and public believe that a good reputation
is a priority to define whether a company is trustworthy and able to meet their
expectation (Chan 2014).
This paper shows that when the firm’s engagement in social activities—promoted
also by policy-makers—is considered, the increasing social concern makes more
likely that the firm, in a network industry, prefers the RTM agenda when those
effects are not very intense, especially in the presence of a sufficiently weak union.
Thus, the presence of strong firm’s social responsibility tends to restore the
conventional result of the trade-union economics that the monopolist prefers RTM.
However, this leads to rather paradoxical conclusions as regards the widespread
belief of the welfare-enhancing effects of socially responsible actions by firms.
Indeed, since RTM is always welfare-inferior than SEB, this means that the
monopolist engagement in CSR activities may lead to the unwelcome result of
reaching the least social welfare level. This may result rather paradoxical to the
extent that firm’s social responsibility is promoted by policy makers. Therefore, our
result sheds some light on so far unexplored effects of the promotion of social




Moreover, from our analysis, a clear testable hypothesis in industries with
network externalities emerges: the RTM agenda should be more often present in the
firms which have stronger social concerns.
A reasonable extension would be to investigate whether a monopoly firm should
hire a manager to negotiate with the union and, if it is the case, how the findings of
this paper may change.
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Appendix
RTM institution
At stage 3, maximising the monopolist’s objective function, we obtain the following
output function, for given consumers’ expectations:
q y;wð Þ ¼ a c wþ ny
2  r : ð8Þ
From (8), after imposing the ‘‘rational expectations’’ condition at the second
stage, we obtain the output level for given w:
q wð Þ ¼ a c w
2  r  n : ð9Þ
At the first stage of the game, under RTM, the monopolist—union bargaining
unit selects w to maximise the following generalised Nash product,
maxNðwÞ ¼ Wð Þ1b Vð Þb




ðw wÞqð Þb ð10Þ
where b represents the union’s bargaining power.
After substitution of (9) in (10), and recalling the ‘‘rational expectations’’
condition y ¼ q, maximisation of (10) w.r.t. w leads to:
wRTM ¼ 2w
ð1  bÞ þ bða cÞ
2
ð11Þ
Substitution of (11) into (9) gives the equilibrium output
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qRTM ¼ ð2  bÞða c w
Þ
2ð2  r  nÞ ð12Þ
Social welfare is defined by
SW ¼ pþ CSþ V ð13Þ
Further substitutions of (10) and (11) in (1), (4), (5) and (13) lead to the
equilibrium outcomes reported in Table 2.
Sequential efficient bargaining institution
Under SEB the monopolist-union bargaining unit maximises the following
generalised Nash product,






Hence, the monopolist—union unit selects in the first stage w, then expectations
realise and finally, in the third stage l, or equivalently q is negotiated.
At the third stage, maximising (14) w.r.t. q, one gets the monopolist’s output
function:
q y;wð Þ ¼
ða c wþ nyÞ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
n2y2 þ 2ny a c w bryð2bÞð2rÞ
2
h i
þ ða c wÞ2
n o
r
ð2  bÞð2  rÞ :
ð15Þ
From (15), after imposing the ‘‘rational expectations’’ condition at stage 2, we
obtain the output level for given w:
qSEB ¼ 2ða c wÞ
2ð2  r  nÞ  b½2  ð1 þ nÞr : ð16Þ
In the first stage, after substitution of (16) in (14), the usual maximisation
procedure w.r.t. w leads to
wSEB ¼ 2w
ð1  bÞ þ bða cÞ
2
ð17Þ
It is easy to see that wSEB ¼ wRTM . Further substitutions of (16) and (17) in (1),
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